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Abstract
Intentional binding refers to the fact that when a voluntary action produces a sensory outcome, action and outcome are
perceived as being closer together in time. This phenomenon is often attributed, at least partially, to predictive motor
mechanisms. However, previous studies failed to unequivocally attribute intentional binding to these mechanisms, since the
contrasts that have been used to demonstrate intentional binding covered not only one but two processes: temporal
control and motor identity prediction. In the present study we aimed to isolate the respective role of each of these
processes in the emergence of intentional binding of action-effects. The results show that motor identity prediction does
not modulate intentional binding of action-effects. Our findings cast doubts on the assumption that intentional binding of
action effects is linked to internal forward predictive process.
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Introduction
Intentional binding refers to the observation that when a
voluntary action produces a sensory outcome, action and outcome
are perceived as closer together in time [1]. Notably, stimuli
triggered by voluntary actions are perceived as occurring earlier in
time, and actions producing sensory outcomes are perceived as
occurring later in time, relative to a baseline in which actions and
stimuli occur alone. This phenomenon is often interpreted as
related to the experience of agency [2,3], since the temporal
compression of the interval between actions and consequences
may help individuals determine whether a sensory event was
caused by them or not.
It has been proposed that both predictive and postdictive
mechanisms are responsible for the emergence of intentional
binding [4–6]. Recent research has begun to dissociate the two
different aspects of intentional binding – namely, the shift in the
perceived time of the action and the perceived time of the action
effect – with respect to the relative contributions of predictive and
postdictive mechanisms. Notably Moore et al. [7] demonstrated
that a disruption of pre-SMA – normally associated with predictive
mechanisms [8] – by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)
affected the perception of the time of the sensory effect but not
of the movement. This finding suggests that the shift of the
perception of the action effect results from predictive processes,
whereas the shift of the movement doesn’t (but see [6]). Since in
the present study we were interested in investigating the role of
predictive action mechanisms in intentional binding, we chose to
focus only on the perceived time of the action-effect.
It has been suggested that the predictive mechanisms underlying
intentional binding are motor-based predictive processes [2,6,7,9,10].
According to a widely accepted theory of motor control, internal
forward models predict the perceptual consequences that a given
action produces [11]. It is assumed that the prediction provided by
internal forward models can be very specific and pertain to the exact
identity of the action’s perceptual consequences. The motor
prediction of the identity of the action perceptual consequence is
used to provide internal feedback of the predicted outcome of an
action which can be used before sensory feedback is available [11],
thereby shifting earlier in time the perceived occurrence of action
effects. However, the precise mechanism of this temporal shift
remains unknown [12,13].
However, more importantly, if predictive forward mechanisms
drive binding, then it should only occur in situations in which the
agent is able to predict the identity of the sensory event s/he is
going to produce, for example, when a particular action triggers a
particular tone (or when two particular actions trigger two
particular tones). The present study aimed to directly assess the
role of such motor identity prediction mechanisms in intentional
binding and compare these to other processes such as temporal
prediction and temporal control [14]. To illustrate these two
mechanisms, the agent can temporally predict the occurrence of a
stimulus, for example, when it is preceded by a cue at a fixed
time before the stimulus, or when it is generated by a passive
movement. In both situations participants would be able to predict
the point in time at which the stimulus appears. The agent can
temporally control the occurrence of a stimulus when s/he actually
produces the stimulus by means of an action. In this instance
participants can not only predict the onset of the stimulus, they
also have control over the onset. Note that being able to predict/
control the timing of a stimulus may alter a number of processes
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important for the perception of the stimulus. For example,
temporal prediction may alter the allocation of attentional
resources after the appearance of the cue, as highlighted by
research in the field of temporal attention [15,16]. Temporal
control may simply allow participants to focus attention and
reduce distraction even before triggering the stimulus event.
Intentional binding has normally been assessed by comparing
an experimental condition in which a sensory event followed a
voluntary action (which involved both temporal control and motor
identity prediction) to a control condition in which the same
sensory event followed either another stimulus [17–20] or the
participant’s passive movement provoked by the experimenter
[1,5,9,10,21,22]. For instance, Haggard, Clark and Kalogeras [1],
asked participants to trigger a tone by executing a key-press at a
time of their choice (experimental condition). Participants had to
judge, in separate blocks, the time of either their key-press or the
subsequent tone, by referring to a clock-hand that rotated around
a clock face. They observed a perceptual shift of both the time of
the action and the time of the sensory event, such that the two
events were bound closer in time. Critically, these perceptual shifts
did not occur when TMS induced the participant to make an
involuntary key-press (control condition). In another recent study
of Humphreys and Buehner [18] participants executed voluntary
key-presses which resulted in the delivery of tone (experimental
condition). In the control condition participants did not perform
any actions; instead, they were presented with an audible click,
which was followed by the same tone as in the experimental
condition. Participants had to estimate the length of the interval
between their button press and the tone (experimental condition),
or the click and the tone (control condition). The authors found
that action intervals were judged shorter than equivalent control
intervals. In each of these experiments it is not possible to
disentangle the role of motor identity prediction and temporal
control since participants always performed a single action which
leads to the same action effect, thus the experimental task typically
included both motor identity prediction and temporal control
while the control task included neither.
Thus, the aim of the present study was to investigate whether
binding effects are modulated by motor identity prediction and
therefore to determine whether motor predictive mechanisms
contribute to the binding phenomenon. In a first experiment we
contrasted a condition in which participants temporally controlled
the onset of an auditory stimulus but could not predict its identity
with a condition in which participants’ actions generated specific
auditory stimuli, thus allowing them to predict the exact identity of
the auditory stimulus they were going to produce. If intentional
binding is produced by motor identity prediction then it should be
greater for the condition in which the identity of the effect is
predicted by the chosen action. In a second experiment
participants’ action produced an auditory stimulus that was either
congruent or incongruent with respect to the action-effect
association they learned in a previous acquisition phase. If
intentional binding is dependent on accurate prediction of the
identity of the action effect then it should be greater in the
congruent condition compared to the incongruent condition.
To foreshadow the results, our findings cast doubt on the
assumption that intentional binding of action-effects is based on
specific predictive motor mechanisms.
Materials and Methods
1. Experiment 1
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to investigate the role that
temporal control and motor identity prediction play in intentional
binding of action-effects. Participants completed three experimen-
tal conditions. In the motor-identity and temporal-control
conditions, they performed randomly left or right key-presses. In
the motor-identity condition each key-press produced a specific
auditory stimulus, thus allowing participants to predict the exact
identity of the auditory effect. In the temporal control condition
left/right key-press generated randomly one of two auditory
stimuli. Participants were therefore unable to predict the exact
identity of the sensory effect, but they nevertheless temporally
controlled its onset. Finally, in the temporal-prediction condition
auditory stimuli were externally generated and were preceded by a
cue (a sound) at a fixed time before the target stimulus, thus
making the target stimuli temporally predictable.
The comparison between the temporal-control and the
temporal-prediction condition assesses the influence of temporal
control on intentional binding of action-effects. The comparison
between the temporal-control and motor-identity conditions
assesses the influence of motor identity prediction. For example,
if intentional binding is entirely due to internal forward models
participants should manifest stronger anticipation in the motor-
identity condition than in the two other conditions (with no
difference between the latter). If, however, intentional binding is
entirely due to temporal control participants should manifest
stronger anticipation in the motor-identity condition and the
temporal control condition (with no difference between these
conditions) than in the temporal prediction condition. Of course, if
both these factors are effective, the design also allows for the
assessment of their relative influences.
1.1. Participants. Twenty-four subjects (average age 25.12
years; sd = 5.11) participated in the Experiment 1 for an allowance
of J 10/h. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, normal
hearing and were naı¨ve as to the hypothesis under investigation.
They all gave written informed consent before participating in the
experiment. The study was conducted in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the Ethics Committee
for Biomedical Research (CERB) Ile de France II.
1.2. Material. Stimulus presentation and data acquisition
were conducted using the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions
[23,24] for Matlab 7.5.0 running on a PC computer connected to
a 19-in. 85 Hz CRT monitor (IIYAMA HM 903 DT A).
1.3. Stimuli and Procedure. Participants completed three
conditions (motor-identity, temporal-control and temporal-prediction) in
separate blocks. Each block consisted of 100 trials. Block
presentation was counterbalanced across subjects. In all trials of
each condition participants were presented with a clock-face
marked with 5 ‘min’ intervals and a clock-hand (1.5 cm of length
and 0.1 cm of width) rotating with a period of 2560 ms. On each
trial the initial clock-hand position was randomly chosen.
In the motor-identity and temporal-control conditions participants
were instructed to carry out left or right key-presses in random
order and about equally often. Feedback of the proportion of right
and left key-presses was provided every 25 trials. Participants were
instructed to avoid responding in a stereotyped way, at a pre-
decided clock time, or during the first half rotation of the clock-
hand. Participants’ actions produced two auditory stimuli. The
first sound, a 750 Hz sawtooth sound, was presented simulta-
neously with the participants’ key-press from its onset to its off-set.
The second was either a 1000 Hz (high) or a 500 Hz (low) pure
tone. The duration of both tones was 100 ms. They were
presented 450 ms after the onset of the participants action. In
the motor-identity condition participants’ actions triggered a specific
tone. For half of the participants, a right key-press produced a
high-tone and a left key-press produced low-tone. For the other
half of participants, the mapping was reversed. In contrast, in the
Mechanisms of Intentional Binding
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temporal-control condition both actions could trigger either a high-
tone or a low-tone with a probability of .5.
In the temporal-prediction condition both auditory stimuli (the
sawtooth sound and the high/low tone) were externally generated.
The sawtooth sound served as cue to predict the onset of the
subsequent high/low tone. However, participants could neither
control the time of occurrence of the high/low tone nor predict its
identity (the probability of occurrence of each tone was set to .5).
The onsets and durations of the sawtooth sound were individually
yoked to the action production times recorded in the immediately
previous action condition. However, if the participant started the
experiment with the temporal-prediction condition we used key-
press duration and onset values drawn from a normal distribution
characterized by the mean and standard deviation calculated from
the action production times of the two previous participants.
In each condition the clock-hand stopped at a random position
1–2 sec. after the high/low tone and then disappeared. Thereaf-
ter, participants reported, using a computer keypad, the onset-time
of the high/low tone. They were encouraged to use the highest
possible precision, and were not restricted to use the numbers
marked on the clock-face.
In order to ensure that the participants paid attention to the
identity (high/low) of the action-effect, the experiment included
12% of catch trials where participants indicated whether they
heard a high or a low-tone. Catch trials occurred randomly and
equally often on high and low-tone trials.
Each block was preceded by an acquisition phase, where
participants learned action-effect (action conditions) and stimulus-
stimulus (temporal-prediction condition) contingencies. Each
acquisition phase consisted of 50 trials. In the motor-identity
acquisition phase participants associated right and left actions with
a specific tone (high or low). In the temporal-control acquisition
phase participants executed right or left key-presses followed either
by a high or a low-tone with a probability of .5. Finally, in the
temporal-prediction acquisition phase participants learnt to
temporally predict the occurrence of the high/low tone from a
cue (the sawtooth sound).
2. Experiment 2
The aim of Experiment 2 was to rule out a possible confound
between motor identity prediction and temporal control that
might have been involved in Experiment 1 (see results Experiment
1). As such, in Experiment 2, participants’ actions produced an
auditory stimulus that was either congruent or incongruent with
respect to the action-effect association they learned in a previous
acquisition phase.
Experiment 2 comprised an action-to-tone and a tone-to-tone
block. Each block was preceded by an acquisition phase during
which associations between either two actions (left or right action
in the action-to-tone block) or two sounds (sound A or B in the
tone-to-tone block), on the one hand, and two auditory stimuli
(high/low tone) were formed. During both action-to-tone and
tone-to-tone blocks we assessed the influence of these associations
on participants’ temporal estimations of the onset of high/low
tones. In both blocks participants were presented with congruent
and incongruent trials in which the associations they learned in the
previous acquisition phases between actions/sounds and the
subsequent tone was either respected or violated.
Accordingly, the internal forward models theory of intentional
binding would predict a stronger anticipation in congruent trials
than in incongruent trials. This assumption is supported by a
recent study on sensory suppression, a perceptual phenomenon
that is likewise suggested to be based on predictive forward model
mechanisms [25,26]. For instance, in Cardoso-Leite et al. [12]
study participants associated to left and right hand action Gabor
patches of different orientations. In the test phase, participants
were presented with near threshold Gabor patches whose
orientations were either congruent or incongruent with their
learned action-effect association. On half of the trials no patch was
presented, and participants were required to determine on each
trial whether a Gabor patch was presented or not. Perceptual
sensitivity (d9) was consistently lower in the congruent condition.
To check that these effects were caused by motor identity
prediction, and not caused by identity prediction independent of
action, the authors ran a control task. In this task participants
pressed both buttons at the same time and heard a concurrent
sound. The pitch of this sound predicted which of the two
orientations would be presented. As with the previous task,
participants first acquired the relevant mappings and were then
tested in a visual detection task using congruent and incongruent
trials. Interestingly, the authors did not find any difference in
sensitivity for congruent or incongruent trials in this control task,
confirming that identity prediction alone (i.e. non motor identity
prediction) did not drive the difference in the action prediction
condition.
Thus, similarly if intentional binding of action-effects is based
on predictive motor processes we should expect to observe: firstly,
a stronger anticipation in the action congruent trials than in the
action incongruent trials, and secondly, no difference between
congruent and incongruent trials in the tone-to-tone prediction
task. This would confirm unambiguously that motor identity
prediction and not identity prediction independent of action drives
the difference in our action-to-tone prediction condition, thus
corroborating the idea that predictive motor processes play a
crucial role on the emergence of the intentional biding of action
effects.
2.1. Participants. Thirty-two subjects (average age 25.91
years; sd = 5.52) participated in the experiment for an allowance of
J 10/h. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, normal
hearing and were naı¨ve as to the hypothesis under investigation.
They all gave written informed consent before participating in the
experiment. The study was conducted in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the Ethics
Committee for Biomedical Research (CERB) Ile de France II.
2.2. Material. See Experiment 1
2.3. Stimuli and procedure. Participants completed an
action-to-tone and a tone-to-tone condition. Condition
presentation was counterbalanced across participants. Each
condition included an acquisition phase and a test phase. During
the acquisition phases an association was formed between two
particular tones and either two actions (action acquisition phase) or
two sounds (tone-to-tone acquisition phase). The test phases
assessed the influence of these associations on the temporal
perception of the tones. In both conditions participants were
presented with the same clock-like stimulus we used in the
Experiment 1.
Acquisition phases. Each acquisition phase consisted of 100
trials. In the action-to-tone acquisition phase participants executed
left or right key-presses in a random order and about equally often.
Feedback of the proportion of right and left key-presses was
provided after 34 trials and 68 trials. They were instructed to avoid
responding in a stereotyped way or during the first half rotation of
the clock-hand. The initial clock-hand position was randomly
chosen in each trial. For half of the participants, the right key-press
produced a 1000 Hz pure tone (high-tone) and the left key-press
produced a 500 Hz pure tone (low-tone). For the other half, the
reverse mapping was used. The high/low tone lasted 100 ms and
its onset was fixed to 400 ms after the participants’ action onset.
Mechanisms of Intentional Binding
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In the tone-to-tone acquisition phase participants’ actions were
replaced with two sounds: a bell shaped sound and a sinusoidal
sound (from now on labeled sound A and B, respectively), to which
we applied a mid-level expansion using Adobe Audition version
1.0. The mean frequency of both sounds was set to 750 Hz and
their duration was fixed to 200 ms. For half of the participants
sound A and sound B were followed (after 400 ms SOA) by a high-
tone and a low-tone, respectively. For the other half, the reverse
mapping was used.
Although, previous studies on the intentional binding used an
action/tone - effect interval of 200–300 ms [1], we decided to use
a 400 ms SOA to give participants enough time to process the cue
and to ensure that they could easily predict the identity of the
subsequent tone. We were confident to be able to reproduce
intentional binding with this SOA, indeed several recent studies
observed binding with interval longer than 400 ms [10,27–29].
The onset of sound A and B were individually yoked to the
movement production times recorded in the action-to-tone
acquisition phase. However, if the participant started the
experiment with the tone-to-tone condition, the onset of sound
A/B was yoked to the action production times of the previous
participant.
Test phases. Both action-to-tone and tone-to-tone test phases
consisted of 240 trials divided in 24 mini-blocks of 10 trials each.
In the action-to-tone mini-blocks participants generated a high/low
tone by performing left or right-key presses. During each mini-
block they were required to execute either only left or only right
key-press, resulting in 12 right and 12 left action-to-tone mini-
blocks presented alternately and counterbalanced across subjects.
Information concerning the action they had to execute was
provided at the beginning of each mini-block.
In the tone-to-tone mini-blocks participants were presented with
two externally generated auditory stimuli: a sound A or B and a
subsequent high/low-tone. During each mini-block participant
heard always the same first sound, resulting in 12 sound A and 12
sound B mini-blocks presented alternately with mini-blocks
presentation being counterbalanced across subjects. Information
concerning which first sound (A or B) they were going to hear was
provided at the beginning of each mini-block.
In both action-to-tone and tone-to-tone mini-blocks participants
were presented with congruent and incongruent trials in which the
associations they learned in the previous acquisition phases
between left/right action (action-to-tone condition) or sound A/
B (tone-to-tone condition), and the subsequent tone was respected
or violated, respectively.
We chose to block the trials in to mini-blocks to simplify the task
for the participants and to maximize their ability to predict the
identity of the effect tone. Including a random ordering of trials in
the tone-to-tone condition would likely have been particularly
confusing for participants, since they would first have to identify
the first tone and use that to predict the second tone. By blocking
both tasks we ensured that in each condition participants could
easily predict the effect-tone, and that this would be reinforced on
each trial by the presentation of the paired tone or action.
This increased predictability should also help to highlight the
incongruent trials in both tasks. The probability of the participant
being presented with an incongruent tone was set to .3 for 8 mini-
blocks and to .2 and .1 for the remaining two groups of 8 mini-
blocks, resulting in an overall probability of to .2 for both action-
to-tone and tone-to-tone condition. We chose this probability
distribution in order to prevent participants from understanding
the pattern of presentation of the incongruent tones. Incongruent
trials were randomly distributed between the 4th and the last trial
of each mini-block.
In each trial the clock-hand stopped at a random position 1–
2 sec. after the high/low tone and then disappeared. Thereafter,
as in the Experiment 1, participants reported the onset of the
high/low tone. We included 15% of catch trials where participants
indicated whether they heard a high or a low-tone. Catch trials
were randomly distributed and occurred equally often on
congruent and incongruent trials.
Results
1. Experiment 1
Participants made on average 52.12% of their voluntary actions
with their right-hand and 47.88% with their left-hand in the
temporal control condition and 51.5% right-hand action and
48.5% left-hand action in the motor-identity condition, indicating
a non-significant tendency to press with the right hand in both
conditions, t(23) = 1.925, p = .0666 and t(23) = 1.5698 = .1301,
respectively.
The mean temporal estimation error, defined as the difference
between estimated and actual onset of the tone was calculated for each
condition (Estimation error = Onset(estimated)2onset(physical)).
A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
Condition (temporal control, temporal-prediction and motor-
identity) and Tone (high and low) as factors revealed a significant
main effect of condition on participants’ temporal estimations
error, F(2, 46) = 14.909, p = .0000. Neither the main effect of tone
nor its interaction with Condition was significant. Paired two-
tailed t-test revealed a significant difference between temporal-
control and temporal-prediction, t(23) = 4.193, p = .0003, with the
tones being significantly anticipated in the temporal-control
compared to the temporal-prediction condition. The tones were
also significantly anticipated in the motor-identity condition
compared to the temporal-prediction condition t(23) = 5.7615,
p = .0000. However, no significant difference was found between
temporal-control and motor-identity condition, t(23) = 0.2042,
p = .8399 (Fig. 1).
Catch trial analysis revealed that participants made about 99%
of correct response in the three conditions. A repeated measure
ANOVA showed that responses to catch trials did not differed
between conditions F(2, 46) = .10698, p = .89877. Thus, it is
unlikely that the absence of any modulations of identity prediction
Figure 1. Mean temporal estimation error in ms for the
temporal-control, temporal-prediction and motor-identity con-
dition. Bars represent standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029557.g001
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on subjects’ estimations is due to a lack of attention of the tones
that participants generated.
Preliminary discussion. To sum up, we observed the classic
intentional binding effect as usually assessed by comparing an
action condition (or rather two action conditions in our case) to a
temporal-prediction condition. However, the prediction of the
identity of the action’s perceptual consequence did not influence
participants’ temporal estimations at all. This suggests the
temporal control of the onset of the action-effect is sufficient to
drive the binding we observed in both action conditions.
However, one may argue that motor identity prediction was
also involved in the temporal-control condition. Namely, in a
context where two action-effects have the same probability of
occurrence, the motor systems might be able to predict both
sensory consequences. Indeed, the prediction of more than one
action perceptual consequence might be important given that it
potentially allows an organism to rapidly correct and reorient its
behavior. To rule out this possibility we ran a second experiment
in which participants’ actions produced an auditory stimulus that
was either congruent or incongruent with respect to the action-
effect association they learned in a previous acquisition phase (see
above).
2. Experiment 2
Catch trial analysis revealed that one participant had to be
excluded from further analysis due to extremely poor performance
(the subject correctly identified only 29.17% of catch tones during
the action-to-tone catch trials and 62.5% during the tone-to-tone
catch trials). For all the other participants, performance was very
high for both conditions (mean(action-to-tone) = 98.85% of correct
responses; mean(tone-to-tone) = 96.03% of correct responses).
Error rates did not differ between the conditions.
The mean temporal estimation error, defined as the difference
between estimated and actual onset of the tone was calculated for
each condition. Anticipatory estimates are represented as negative
values. A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
Condition (action-to-tone and tone-to-tone) and Congruency
(congruent and incongruent) as factors revealed a significant main
effect of condition on participants’ temporal estimations error, F(1,
30) = 51.360, p = .0000, with tones being significantly anticipated
in the action-to-tone compared to the tone-to-tone condition.
However the interaction between Condition and Congruency was
not significant F(1, 30) = 1.4839, p = .2326.
Further two paired two-tailed t-tests showed no congruency
effect neither in the action-to-tone condition nor in the tone-
to-tone condition, t(30) = 0.9868, p = .3316 and t(30) = 0.9355,
p = .3569 respectively (Fig. 2), suggesting that the prediction of the
identity of the auditory stimulus does not play any role in the
estimation of its onset time.
Preliminary discussion. Thus, as in the experiment 1 we
replicated the classical intentional binding effect as usually assessed
by comparing an action-to-tone condition (action-to-tone blocks)
to a temporal-prediction condition (tone-to-tone blocks). However,
we did not find any effect of identity prediction in either the
action-to-tone condition or the tone-to-tone condition. This
corroborates the conclusions of Experiment 1, namely that
motor identity prediction does not influence intentional binding.
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to assess the role of predictive
motor mechanisms on the emergence of intentional binding.
Although intentional binding has often been explained in terms of
predictive motor processes [2,6,7,9,10,19], previous studies did not
unambiguously show motor identity prediction to be its basis, as
they compared conditions that differed in terms of both temporal
control and motor identity prediction processes.
To assess the influence of predictive motor processes on
intentional binding we ran two experiments including contrasts
differing in terms motor identity prediction only. In both
experiments we replicated the classical binding effect with auditory
stimuli being perceived earlier when they were produced by the
participants’ actions compared to when they were externally
generated. However, we found that neither the ability to predict
the precise identity of the stimulus dependent on which action was
performed (Experiment 1), nor the accuracy of this prediction
(Experiment 2) influenced the magnitude of the binding effect.
These findings suggest that intentional binding of action-effects is
not based on predictive motor processes.
We observed significant differences between conditions that
varied in the presence or absence of temporal control, but no such
differences associated with the presence of motor identity
prediction. We defined temporal control as the ability to control
(via an action) the onset of the relevant stimulus (action-effect).
How might such temporal control produce the binding effect? One
possibility is that although the action-effect in the two conditions
were matched in terms of overall temporal prediction, processing
of the cue might differ between the two conditions leading to
differences in allocation of attentional resources. More precisely,
the cue (the action in the temporal-control condition or the
auditory cue in the temporal-prediction condition) would only be
predictable in the temporal-control condition since participants
can decide when to press the button while in the temporal
prediction condition they would not know when exactly the
auditory cue would appear. This may in itself produce an orienting
response to the auditory cue, that is absent in the temporal-control
condition and that could, in turn, influence sensory processing of
the subsequent stimulus. Indeed, the capacity to decide when to
execute an action (temporal-control condition) may have allowed
participants to reduce distraction during each trial and to focus
attention to the subsequent stimulus, leading them to perceive the
action-effect as occurring earlier due to prior entry [30,31].
One might argue that the absence of any congruency effect in
the second experiment might be due to the fact that participants
failed to associate action-effect pairs in the acquisition phase. Fifty
repetitions of a given action-effect coupling might simply have
Figure 2. Mean temporal estimation error in ms for both
action-to-tone and tone-to-tone blocks. Bars represent standard
errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029557.g002
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been insufficient to link the motor code with the subsequent
sensory effect. A failure to associate action and effect in the
acquisition phase would make action effect prediction in the test
phase impossible. Indeed, some previous studies that investigated
action-effect learning and action effect prediction included an
acquisition phase comprising approximately 100 trials of a given
action-effect association [32–35]. However, more recent studies
showed that action-effect associations are learned rather quickly,
namely, after much less than 50 repetitions of an action-effect
pairing [36,37]. Wolfensteller & Ruge [31] showed that even 8
repetitions are sufficient to link an action to a subsequent effect.
We therefore feel confident that the participants of Experiment 2
did learn the action-effect associations.
Another possible objection is that participants might have linked
their actions to the incongruent tone in the test phase, after which
they begin to predict both tones for both actions. However, several
findings make this unlikely. Firstly, Wolfensteller & Ruge [31]
showed that although action-effect associations are learned already
after few encounters, the associations get more stable as the
number of repetitions increases. Secondly, Elsner and Hommel
[33] showed that the frequency of co-occurrence of an action and
an effect is also a critical factor for the acquisition of action-effect
learning. Learning in the test phase is, thus, unlikely. Finally,
similarly to our experiment, recent studies successfully manipulat-
ed the congruency of a given sensory effect with respect to the
association that participants learned in a previous acquisition
phase. They showed that the congruency of action and predicted
effect modulate motor control related phenomena, such as sensory
attenuation of self-generated stimuli [12] and deviance processing
in the brain [30].
A further objection might be that by blocking the response hand
in the second experiment this might have put the participants in a
less predictive ‘‘set’’ compared to a condition in which the
response hand is chosen by the participants. Indeed, it has been
shown spatial attention effects are larger when attention is cued on
a trial-by-trial basis than when attention is constant for a whole
block [38], suggesting that employing mini-blocks rather than
allowing the prediction to vary on a trial-to-trial basis may have
reduced the magnitude of any prediction.
However, as we pointed out in the procedure section, blocking
trials in to mini-blocks simplified the task for the participants.
Including a random ordering of trials in the tone-to-tone condition
would likely have been particularly confusing for participants,
since they would first have to identify the first tone and use that to
predict the second tone. Additionally, blocking the trials should
help to highlight the incongruent trials in both tasks.
Intentional binding has often been interpreted as related to the
sense of agency, since it may help individuals determine whether a
sensory event was caused by them or not [1]. This interpretation is
due in part to the fact that binding has reliably been observed in
cases in which individuals are the agent of an action, thus when
internal efferent information is provided by motor processes that
are used to prepare and execute an action [2]. However, our
results seem to suggest that binding is not linked to motor
predictive mechanism but rather to temporal control. Do these
findings weaken the link between intentional binding and the sense
of agency? A definitive answer to this question would be
premature at this stage. Further studies need to be carried out in
order to clearly highlight the relation between binding and the
sense of agency. However, even if the phenomenon of binding of
actions to their effects is not due to motor predictive processes it
could still contribute to the emergence of sense of agency by, for
instance, accentuating people’s perception of the temporal
contiguity between actions and their effects.
The results we report here provide new insights into
mechanisms of intentional binding of action-effects. They cast
doubt on the assumption that intentional binding is based on
predictive motor mechanisms. Instead, the temporal control of a
stimulus, by means of a voluntary action, might be sufficient to
trigger the binding effect observed in the present and previous
experiments.
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